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LEARNING LESSONS FROM INDIA: THE
RECENT HISTORY OF ANTITERRORIST
LEGISLATION ON THE SUBCONTINENT
MANAS MOHAPATRA*
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 26, 2001, one month after the most deadly terrorist attack
to ever be carried out on U.S. soil,' the Uniting and Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 20012 became law. Prior to the
enactment of the PATRIOT Act, the United States had minimal legislation
specifically targeted at terrorist activity.3  However, two years after the
* J.D. Candidate 2005, Northwestern University School of Law. I would like to thank
my parents, Ram and Jhunu Mohapatra, and my sister, Seema Mohapatra Reddy, for all their
love and support. Additonally, I would like to thank Professors Len Rubinowitz, Dorothy
Roberts, and Bernadine Dohm for their helpful guidance and encouragement throughout my
law school career. Finally, I would like to thank Nithya Raman, who provided invaluable
help during the completion of this comment.
1 In addition to the 3000 fatalities suffered in New York, Washington D.C., and
Pennsylvania, a figure that exceeded the number of fatalities from any previous terrorist
attack by a factor of ten, Paul R. Pillar, Fighting International Terrorism: Beyond September
11, Address at the College of William and Mary, Nov. 28, 2001, available at
http://www.cia.gov/nic/PDF-GIF speeches/wmspeechNov0l.pdf, the direct economic costs
of the terrorist attacks of September 11 th, 2001, was estimated to be over $100 billion
dollars. Department of Defense Budget Priority for Fiscal Year 2004: Hearing Before the
Committee on the Budget House of Rep., 108th Cong. 4 (2003) (prepared statement for Paul
Wolfowitz), available at http://www.house.gov/budgethearings/wolfowitzstmnt022703.htm.
2 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26,
2001) [hereinafter PATRIOT Act]. The bill was passed in the Senate, with no debate or
hearings, by a vote of 98-1, 147 CONG. REC. S11,059-60 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001), and by the
House of Representatives by a vote of 357-66. 147 CONG. REC. H7224 (daily ed. Oct. 24,
2001).
3 See CENTER FOR ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION, HISTORY OF U.S. COUNTER-
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passage of the PATRIOT Act, and despite heavy criticisms and
denouncements from civil libertarian groups4 and over 220 city council
resolutions opposing the Act,5 the Department of Justice proposed a new
bill, the Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003, nicknamed
PATRIOT Act II by some,6 which would further expand the powers of the
federal government and law enforcement agencies in the ongoing War on
Terror. The government's proposal of PATRIOT Act II follows the course
of action of numerous other countries that have responded to terrorist
attacks between their own borders by passing more and more criminal
legislation.
On December 13th, 2001, halfway across the world from the mourning
United States, a group of heavily armed militants attempted to storm India's
Parliament in New Delhi, triggering off a firefight in which five of the
attackers and fourteen innocents were killed. Security forces immediately
sealed off the red sandstone parliament building where, ironically,
discussions were to have begun on a new antiterrorist bill.8 The bill, the
Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), which originally had failed to get
Parliamentary approval when discussed in 2000, was passed soon after in a
rare joint session of both Houses of the Indian Parliament.9
With the original PATRIOT Act set to expire on December 31, 2005, a
TERRORISMPOLICY, available at http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/terrorism/101/
history.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2004). The most substantial piece of anti-terrorist
legislation prior to the PATRIOT Act was the Anti-Terrorism Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132 (1996).
4 See, e.g., LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL:
LIBERTY AND SECURITY FOR THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 UNITED STATES (2003), available at
http://www.lchr.org/pubs/descriptions/Assessing/AssessingtheNewNormal.pdf;
Press Release, ACLU, PATRIOT Act Fears Are Stifling Free Speech, ACLU Says in
Challenge to Law, (Nov. 3, 2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/
SafeandFree.cfm?ID = 14307&c= 262.
5 Included in this group are Los Angeles and Chicago. ACLU, Dallas Residents: Oppose
the USA PATRIOT Act, available at http://www.aclu.org/NationalSecurity/
NationalSecurity.cfm?ID=14483&c=24 (last visited Oct. 28, 2004).
6 [citation to Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003] [hereinafter PATRIOT Act
II]; Donald A. Downs, A Response To Anthony Lewis: Civil Liberties in a New Kind of War,
2003 WIS. L. REv. 385, 388 (2003) (discussing the circulation of the draft form of the
Domestic Security Enforcement Act).
7 Microsoft Network India, Complete Coverage: December 13th Attack, at
http://server1.msn.co.in/completecoverage/DecI3attack/index.asp [hereinafter December
13th Attack] (last visited Oct. 28, 2004); see also India on High Alert After Attack on
Parliament, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 13, 2001; Six Gunmen Open Fire on Indian
Parliament, OAKLAND TRIB., Dec. 13, 2001.
8 December 13th Attack, supra note 7.
9 Id.
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debate regarding the effectiveness of the legislation currently rages.' 0 The
efficacy of the counter-terrorist response in the United States has, due to the
relative newness of these domestic attacks, been largely untested. In
contrast, India's legal system, operating under a democratic system
governed by a constitution heavily influenced by the United States,'' has
been responding to recurrent terrorist activity within its borders from
independence in 1947 through to the present day.' 2 The Indian experience
has shown that with each new piece of legislation aimed at fighting
terrorism comes a similar pattern of abuses. India's antiterrorist laws have
consistently been used beyond their originally prescribed scope to bypass
the normal rules and safeguards afforded to criminal defendants under both
the Indian Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure.
This comment will consider the Indian experience in an effort to learn
lessons from a legal system that has had to deal with the dreadful reality of
domestic acts of terrorism and determine whether the same legislative
overreach of antiterrorist legislation is beginning in the United States. Part
II of the comment will examine instances in the United States where
criminal procedure is bypassed in favor of new methods based on the new
threat of terrorism. It will also examine cases that could normally be
handled by the criminal justice system, but have, questionably, been
handled under provisions of new antiterrorist legislation. With this in mind,
this comment will look to the Indian experience in an attempt to gain
insight from the fifty years of experience the Indian legal system has in
grappling with the unique challenges terrorism poses to domestic criminal
law. Part III will analyze why India's experience may be one that the U.S.
legal system may learn from and argue that based on the history of India's
Constitution and the particular nature of the recent terrorist activity within
its borders, India does serve as a good point of comparison for the United
States. The comment will next analyze the history of terrorism in post-
independence India and the government's various responses. Part IV will
10 Declan McCullagh, Bush Wants Patriot Act Renewed, CNET NEWS, Jan. 20, 2004, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-5144203.html.
1i See Vijayashri Sripati, Toward Fifty Years of Constitutionalism and Fundamental
Rights in India: Looking Back to See Ahead (1950-2000), 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 413, 422
(1998).
12 In fact, one of the earliest pieces of anti-terror legislation to be enforced in India was
The Rowlatt Act (1919), enacted under British rule. The most recent national security
legislation to be enacted by the Indian Government is the Prevention of Terrorism Act, C.I.S.
Schedule (2002), The Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2002 of the Indian Parliament, New
Delhi, 28 Mar. 2002 [hereinafter POTA], which entered into law in March 2002. Suhas
Chakma, Symposium, Do Ends Justify Means?, 512 SEMINAR: STATES OF INSECURITY, Apr.
2002, at 27.
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examine reports of abuse of antiterrorist legislation and look at how these
abuses have changed or developed with each new piece of national security
legislation. Having outlined this history, Part V will then analyze the
pattern of constant overreach of India's national security legislation and
examine instances of overreach in the United States. The comment will
conclude with a brief examination of lessons the United States may learn
from India when looking at the legal complexities in the War on Terror.
II. NATIONAL SECURITY LEGISLATION "CREEP" IN THE UNITED STATES
POST-9/1 1
As is well known, the major piece of legislation passed in the wake of
the September 1 th terrorist attacks was the USA PATRIOT Act. 13 Passed
with little debate in the highly tense and emotional time period immediately
following the attacks, the PATRIOT Act was ostensibly the government's
reaction to protect the United States from any further terrorist activity.
14
Despite the public face given to the act by its supporters, the purposes of the
PATRIOT Act were far broader than just battling terrorism. 15 Many of the
provisions endowed law enforcement agencies in general with a greater
amount of freedom in surveillance and investigation.' 6 Included in the act
were provisions that
created new record-keeping and reporting measures on financial institutions, provided
for greater information-sharing among federal intelligence and criminal justice
officials; enable[d] a special intelligence court to authorize the collection by law
enforcement authorities of data from roving wiretaps; enlarge[d] the availability of
information from grand jury investigations; restricts access to biological and chemical
agents and criminalizes their possession for other than peaceful purposes; relaxe[d]
rules for gaining access to electronic communications and student records by
subpoena; provides for limited detention of certified terrorists; and facilitate[d]
governmental eavesdropping and so-called "sneak and peek" searches of private
17premises.
13 Michael P. O'Connor & Celia M. Rumann, Into The Fire: How to Avoid Getting
Burned by the Same Mistakes Made Fighting Terrorism in Northern Ireland, 24 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1657, 1705 (2003).
14 Id. at 1706:
Proponents of the legislation contended that the legislation served three purposes: to strengthen
and streamline the government's ability to gather information to 'disrupt, weaken, and eliminate
the infrastructure of terrorist organizations,' to 'make fighting terrorism a national priority in our
criminal justice system,' and 'to enhance the authority of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service to detain or remove suspected alien terrorists.'
Id.
"5 Id. at 1707.
16 Id.
17 James A.R. Nafziger, The Grave New World of Terrorism: A Lawyer's View, 31 DENY.
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As opposed to specifically targeting gaps in the way the criminal justice
system currently handled the menace of terrorism, the expansion of the
powers of general law enforcement investigatory tools seemed to dominate
the provisions of the PATRIOT Act.18  While initially used in probes
related to battling terrorism, the use of the PATRIOT Act has begun to
creep further into general law enforcement investigations. 19 For example,
in Las Vegas, federal authorities used the money laundering sections within
the PATRIOT Act to access the financial information of strip club owner
Michael Galardi and "numerous other politicians" in a public corruption
probe.20 While some politicians stated that they were unaware that the Act
could be used in non-terrorist related investigations, a spokesman for the
Justice Department replied, "I think probably a lot of members (of
Congress) were only interested in the anti-terrorism measures ... but when
the Judiciary Committee sat down, both Republicans and Democrats, they
obviously discussed the applications, that certain provisions could be used
in regular criminal investigations.'
While the PATRIOT Act had ostensibly been passed directly in
response to September 1 1th, its provisions were a wish list that law
enforcement officials wanted to apply beyond the scope of terrorist-related
activities long before the attacks.22 However, it has become clear to some
that a strictly law enforcement approach to terrorism is inadequate, and in
order to aid the besieged civil authorities, some formal military action is
23necessary. Consequentially, in addition to the PATRIOT Act, Congress
passed Public Law 107-40, which authorized the President to use "all
necessary and appropriate force . . . to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States. 24 This Congressional
declaration of war was the basis of the post-September-i Ith military actions
taken in Afghanistan, but also had effects domestically. A portion of the
action taken on behalf of the Executive to prevent future acts of terrorism
has overlapped with traditional law enforcement duties as the Office of the
President has begun designating suspected members of Al-Qaeda as
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 5 (2002).
18 O'Connor & Rumann, supra note 13, at 1707.
19 See, e.g., J.M. Kalil, PATRIOT ACT: Law's Use Causing Concerns, LAS VEGAS REV.
J., Nov. 5, 2003, at IA.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 O'Connor & Rurnann, supra note 13, at 1707.
23 Derek Jinks, State Responsibility for Sponsorship of Terrorist and Insurgent Groups:
State Responsibility for the Acts of Private Armed Groups, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 83, 91 (2003).
24 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224
(2001).
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"unlawful enemy combatants" and placing them in military detention.25
The power of the Executive to label a U.S. citizen an "unlawful enemy
combatant" was upheld by the Supreme Court in the World War II case Ex
Parte Quirin.26 During the military operations in Afghanistan, a handful of
U.S. citizens were found to have been taking part in the combat against U.S.
forces, and upon their discovery in military detention, were labeled
"unlawful enemy combatants. 27
Although the Executive has argued against the judiciary's right to do
so, since September 11 th the Courts have reserved their right to scrutinize
the designation of an enemy combatant.28 In Rasul v. Bush, the U.S.
government argued that fourteen individuals, who had been detained in the
military hostilities in Afghanistan, had no right to challenge the grounds of
their detention in a U.S. court.29 The Supreme Court, with Justice Stevens
writing the majority decision, rejected the argument, noting:
[p]etitioners' allegations-that, although they have engaged neither in combat nor in
acts of terrorism against the United States, they have been held in Executive detention
for more than two years in territory subject to the long-term, exclusive jurisdiction and
control of the United States, without access to counsel and without being charged with
any wrongdoing-unquestionably describe custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States.
30
The Court remanded the cases to the District Court to consider the
detainees' claims on the merits.
31
One of the most recent cases to involve stretching the "unlawful
enemy combatant" designation is the one of Jose Padilla.32 Padilla is a U.S.
citizen who was picked up in Chicago, Illinois, initially on grounds of
25 Alejandra Rodriguez, Comment, Is the War on Terrorism Compromising Civil
Liberties? A Discussion ofHamdi AndPadilla, 39 CAL. W. L. REv. 379, 381 (2003).
26 Ex Parte Quirin v. Cox, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). In Quirin, eight Nazi saboteurs, including
one U.S. citizen, had been captured after landing in the United States and were scheduled to
face charges in front of a military tribunal. Id. at 8-10. The Court held that unlawful enemy
combatants were those that had violated the universal rules of war and who, based on their
violation, were subject to trial in front of a military tribunal, but not with the traditional
protections afforded to prisoners of war. Id. at 30-31.
27 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Lindh, 212 F.
Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002).
28 Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 464 (agreeing that petitioners have the right to file a writ of habeas
corpus asking for judgment on the validity of their military detention).
29 Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
30 Id. at 2698.
31 Id. at 2699.
32 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004); Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 256 F. Supp. 2d 218
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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acquiring his testimony as a material witness to a grand jury.33 The
Government accused Padilla of being a member of Al-Qaeda and entering
the United States for the purpose of detonating a "dirty bomb. 3 4 Padilla
was labeled an "unlawful enemy combatant" and transferred to a high-
security Navy prison in Charleston, South Carolina.35 Although Padilla's
writ of habeas corpus has not yet been judged on the merits, 36 the original
District Court hearing the case stated that it would determine the validity of
the "unlawful enemy combatant" designation dependent on whether the
Executive had "some evidence" regarding Padilla's connection to Al-
Qaeda.37 The Court's statement underscores the difference in standards
required to detain a suspected terrorist under the powers given to the
Executive versus the traditional constraints faced by law enforcement
officials. While under traditional criminal law, no suspect may be
punishable for a crime unless they are found guilty "beyond a reasonable
doubt," under the "unlawful enemy combatant" standard, the Executive
branch may indefinitely detain a suspected terrorist without bringing formal
charges against them so long as they have "some evidence" to do so.
38
The decreased evidentiary standards required under the Presidential
powers endowed partially by P.L. 107-40 parallels the new powers given to
law enforcement under the PATRIOT Act. Both initiatives are efforts to
better equip the government to fight the asymmetrical warfare undertaken
by the terrorist organizations targeting the United States. Doing this has
meant increasing law enforcement powers and privileges in the hopes that
the world is spared another September 11 th. The danger in this increase in
power and privilege is that it is difficult to keep these powers focused just
on matters related to "terrorism," especially given the fact that it is so hard
to pinpoint the definition of "terrorism."
The temptation to use the greater powers of enforcement beyond the
33 Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2715.
34 Id "[T]he principal type of dirty bomb... combines a conventional explosive, such
as dynamite, with radioactive material." U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, FACT
SHEET ON DIRTY BOMBS, at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/dirty-
bombs.html (last revised Feb. 25, 2004).
35 Rodriquez, supra note 25, at 383.
36 The Supreme Court upheld Padilla's right to challenge his detention, but stated that the
original habeas petition had been filed erroneously in the Southern District of New York,
which did not have jurisdiction over Padilla's custodian, Commander Melanie Marr.
Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711. Padilla's habeas appeal may not ever be heard as it is believed
that, after the Supreme Court decision, the Justice Department has filed charges against
Padilla-nearly two and a half years after first detaining him. See Emma Schwartz, Terror
Indictments May be Linked to Padilla, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2004, at A16.
7 Padilla, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 219.
38 Id.
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problems created by September 11 th has already begun to manifest. As
government officials now are asking for an even greater increase in powers
through the proxy of the PATRIOT Act II, it is important to analyze the
very real danger of the creep of national security legislation into all areas of
criminal law. As dealing with terrorism is a relatively new phenomenon in
the United States, it may be of use to study the long, controversial history of
antiterrorist legislation in India in order to isolate whether patterns exist that
can be seen in the United States. The next section of the comment will
analyze why a comparison with India may be of particular use when
discussing the scope and direction of the antiterrorist response in the United
States.
III. INDIA AS A MODEL FOR THE UNITED STATES
India is not often thought of as a country from which the United States
has much to learn. Burdened with three times the U.S. population in one-
third the total square-mileage, 39 India still faces development challenges
that the United States surmounted decades ago. Despite the wide cultural
and socio-economic differences between them, there are commonalities
between the two countries that provide grounds for learning from one
another. Of particular interest as it relates to counterterrorist response is the
long, bloody history the Indian subcontinent has faced in attempting to
respond to continual acts of domestic terrorism. 40  What makes the
legislative response of India particularly useful for study is the fact that it
has been undertaken firmly entrenched in a constitutional context that is
quite similar to that of the United States.4t In addition, the fact that the
agents of many of the more recent acts of terrorism in India belong to the
same group that has been named responsible for the September lth
attacks42 gives more credence to the notion that there may be some lessons
to be learned regarding antiterrorist responses by looking at the Indian
experience.
A. TERRORISM TN INDIA
Since Independence India has faced terrorist movements in Punjab and
Jammu and Kashmir, bordering Pakistan, and part insurgent-part terrorist
movements in the northeast, bordering Myanmar and Bangladesh; in Bihar,
bordering Nepal; and in certain interior states like Andhra Pradesh, Madhya
39 CIA, INDIA: THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2004), at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/geos/in.html.
40 See discussion infra Part III.A.
41 See discussion infra Part III.B.
42 See infra text accompanying notes 48-50.
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Pradesh and Orissa.4 3 Most recently, on July 28, 2003, a bus bomb was
detonated in Bombay, recently named Mumbai, killing three and injuring
thirty.44 Earlier in the year, in March, a bomb was detonated on a commuter
train in Bombay, which resulted in the death of eleven civilians.45 The
March bombings occurred almost ten years to the day when fifteen massive
explosions were set off throughout Mumbai, resulting in the death of scores
of people and paralyzing the city.46  As of late, the most fertile site of
domestic terrorism has been taking place in the states Jammu and Kashmir.
Indian officials allege that Pakistani sponsored militants have been
launching attacks on Indian security forces in the area and attacking Hindu
civilians.4 7
On October 1, 2001, at least thirty-one people were killed and seventy-
five injured when "Islamic militants, allegedly Pakistanis with close Al-
Qaeda links, launched a suicide attack on the Kashmir state assembly in
Srinagar. ' 48 The first wave of attackers drove an explosive-laden vehicle
into the heavily guarded main gate of the assembly complex, blowing the
gate and themselves up.4 9 Other militants rushed into the building, opening
fire on those inside.50 On May 14, 2002 at least thirty people including
army personnel and seven tourists were killed and forty-eight others were
hurt in an attack inside the army quarters at Kaluchak, Jammu.5' On
November 25, 2002, security forces killed two terrorists after armed
militants attacked the Raghunath and Shiv temples in Jammu, killing at
least thirteen devotees.52 Attacks continue to occur with civilians and
Indian military personnel losing their lives in an all-too-frequent pattern of
violence.
Under the latest antiterrorist legislation in India, the Prevention of
Terrorism Act of 2001, over thirty-two organizations suspected of operating




46 Suhasini Haider, India Boosts Security After Blasts, CNN, Aug. 26, 2003, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/south/08/25/mumbai.blasts/; Clark Staten,
Indian Bombings Caused by "Foreign Extremists ", According to Police, EMERGENCYNET
NEWS, Mar. 1, 1993, at http://www.emergency.com/bombay.htm.
47 Gaurav Kampani, Indo-Pakistani Military Standoff: Why It Isn't Over Yet, Nuclear
Threat Initiative, at http://www.nti.org/e-research/e3_12b.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2004).
48 Microsoft Network India, Heinous Terror Strikes, at http://serverl .msn.co.in/
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Terrorism Act of 2001, over thirty-two organizations suspected of operating
in India have been labeled "terrorist. '" 53 The list of terrorist organization
includes Al Qaida, Al-Umar-Mujahideen, and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, all
groups also designated as terrorist by the USA PATRIOT Act.
54
B. LEGAL SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA
One facet that differentiates India from a number of other developing
countries faced with battling terrorism on its own soil is that India, like the
United States, is a secular, constitutional democracy whose legal system
was heavily influenced by contact with the British system of Common
Law. 55 In 1946, after it became clear that post-War England did not have
the will or energy to maintain India as one of its colonies, the ruling British
Labour government created a Constituent Assembly plan that was meant to
create a Constitution for a new, independent India. 56 When the Constituent
Assembly met for the first time at the end of 1946, its President, Dr.
Satchinda Sinha, urged the members of the assembly to follow the lead set
by America's founding fathers in Philadelphia at the end of their Revolution
against the British. 57 He asked the Assembly members to carefully study
provisions of the U.S. Constitution while drafting India's own.58
The resulting Constitution-the longest in the world--drew from
many foreign constitutions, but was heavily influenced by the United
States, especially as it related to constitutionally protected fundamental
rights.59 One important difference between the United States and India was
the latter's decision to follow the example of Britain by adopting a
60Parliamentary style of government with a strong Federal government.
Despite this structural difference, India did depend heavily on the U.S.
Constitution, particularly for the Bill of Rights, which were largely
incorporated into the Indian Constitution. 61 The first Prime Minister of
India, Jawaharlal Nehru, acknowledged the heavy influence in a speech to
the United States Congress soon after taking office.62
Therefore, in many senses, India is the "constitutional offspring" of the
53 POTA, supra note 12.
54 id.
55 Sripati, supra note 11, at 425, 452, 469.




60 Id. at 423.
61 Id. at 422, 428.
62 id.
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United States.63  As such, "India can serve as a laboratory for testing
difficult questions of constitutional law arising in the United States since
India purposefully incorporated the quintessential aspects of United States
constitutionalism."64
In regards to its Constitutional Criminal Procedure, India follows the
lead of the United States by providing criminal defendants with safeguards
prior to conviction for certain offenses.6 5 Its Constitution guarantees
defendants freedom from being charged for retroactive crimes, double
jeopardy, and self-incrimination.66 Defendants have the right to know the
grounds of their arrest, a right to legal counsel when detained, access to free
legal counsel if deemed indigent, and the right to appear before a magistrate
within twenty-four hours of arrest.
67
The Indian Constitution and that of the United States differ in two
significant respects. The first is that the Indian Constitution lacks a due
process clause.68  Although the Constituent Assembly had originally
included a clause mirroring the U.S.'s, they ultimately adopted a version
stating, "no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except
according to procedure established by law."69  In the early years after
Independence, the Indian Courts read Article 15 as giving the legislature
unfettered power to pass laws restricting life, liberty, and property.7 °
However, in recent years, after the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of
India,71 the Indian Supreme Court has interpreted the Article to mean that
no one may be denied their liberty unless the procedure is "right, just, fair,
and infused with the principles of natural justice.,72
The other major difference in the Indian Constitution is that it allows
for preventive detention.73 This difference has led to substantively different
antiterrorist provisions in India than could be passed in the United States.74
63 Id. at 418.
6 Id. at 417.
65 Id. at 430.
66 Id. at 430-31.
67 id.
68 Id. at 434.
69 INDIA CONST. part III, art. 21.
70 Sripati, supra note 11, at 439.
" A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597 (India). The landmark case centered on the Indian government
impounding the petitioner's passport without any judicial or administrative hearings. The
Court held "that an inquiry in compliance with the principles of natural justice was implicit
in the power given to impound passports for the public good." Id.
72 Sripati, supra note 11, at 442.
73 INDIA CONST. part. III, art. 22, cl. 4-7.
74 For example, the National Security Act of 1980, C.I.S. 65 (1980), The National
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However, as the comment is interested in the pattern of the way antiterrorist
legislation has been used to bypass normal constitutional safeguards, this
difference does not reduce the utility of using India as a point of
comparison
IV. INDIA'S HISTORICAL ANTITERRORIST LEGISLATION
The history of today's modern antiterrorist legislation on the Indian
subcontinent can be traced back to the British introduction of preventive
detention in 1793. 7 That year, the East India Company Act authorized the
government to "secure and detain in custody any person or persons
suspected of carrying on... any illicit correspondence dangerous to the
peace or safety of any of the British settlement or possession in
India .... ,,76 When India won its Independence, the Constituent Assembly
kept this vestige from the British and incorporated preventive detention in
the new Constitution.77 Although this power was understood as harsh, in
the wake of the brutal assassination of Mahatma Gandhi, the framers
believed that preventive detention was the only way save the "infant nation
from being engulfed by communal riots and social unrest."
78
A. ARMED FORCES SPECIAL POWERS ACT, 1958
Since Independence, the list of legislation adopted by both the Central
Indian government and various states is staggering.79 One of the first pieces
of legislation enacted by the new Indian government was the Armed Forces
Security Act of 1980 of the Indian Parliament, New Delhi, 27 Dec. 1980, greatly expanded
the powers of preventive detention in the troubled areas of Assam and Nagaland.
75 Vinay Lal, Normalisation of Antiterrorist Legislation in Democracies: Comparative
Notes on India, Northern Ireland, and Sri Lanka, MANAS: HISTORY AND POLITICS, at
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/southasia/History/Independent/antiterr.html (last visited Oct.
28, 2004).
76 Id.
77 Sripati, supra note 11, at 427.
71 Id at 436.
79 See Lal, supra note 75 (providing a brief, incomplete listing of antiterrorist legislation
that has been adopted in the last fifteen years, including: Prevention of Terrorism Act
(2001); Special Protection Group Act (1988); Criminal Courts and Security Guard Courts
Rules (1987); Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Rules (1986, amended 1987);
National Security Guard Act (1986); Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act
(1985, amended 1987); National Security (Second Amendment) Ordinance (1984); Terrorist
Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act (1984); Chandigarh Disturbed Areas Act (1983);
Punjab Disturbed Areas Act (1983); Armed Forces (Punjab and Chandigarh) Special Powers
Act (1983); Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Safety of Civil Aviation Act (1982);
Anti-Hijacking Act (1982); Essential Services Maintenance Act (1981); National Security
Act (1980, amended 1984 and 1987); Assam Preventive Detention Act (1980); Jammu and
Kashmir Public Safety Act (1978)).
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(Special Powers) Act of 1958 (AFSPA), which extended to the troubled
Northeastern states of Assam and Manipur.80  AFSPA empowered law
enforcement personnel to shoot and kill any person who
is acting in contravention of any law or order for the time being in force in the
disturbed area prohibiting the assembly of more than 5 or more persons or carrying of
weapons or of things capable of being used as weapons or of fire arms, ammunition
or, explosive substances
if the officer determines that it is necessary for maintenance of law and
order in the region. 81 The officer may shoot to kill after giving such due
warning, as he may consider necessary.8 2 These broadly defined provisions
of the AFSPA were justified as a drastic but necessary remedy for the
armed insurgency going on in the Northeastern parts of India. 83 Human
rights organizations interpreted AFSPA as giving law enforcement and
military a "license to extra judicially execute innocent and suspected
persons under the disguise of maintaining law and order."84 They have also
pointed out that despite the extraordinary power given to the armed forces
and the police, AFSPA has "manifestly failed" in solving the problems
caused by the insurgency and has further isolated the residents of the
troubled region from the central government. 85 This pattern of increased
legislation broadening police powers has continued on to the present day,
despite the lack of any substantive evidence that the increase in power has
led to a decrease in the targeted problem-be it insurgency or incidents of
terrorism.
86
While it is clear that responses to terrorism and insurgency movements
have both military and legal components, AFSPA is a quintessential
example of a government favoring the military response due to the
decreased burden of procedural safeguards they encounter if they opt to
80 See SOUTH ASIA HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CENTRE, HUMAN RIGHTS
DOCUMENTATION CENTER, ARMED FORCES SPECIAL POWERS ACT: A STUDY IN NATIONAL
SECURITY TYRRANY, Sec. 4, available at http://www.hrdc.net/sahrdc/resources/
armed forces.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2004) [hereinafter SAHRDC AFSPA Report]; see
also C.I.S. Section 4(c) (1958), Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act of 1958 of the Indian
Parliament, New Delhi, 22 May 1958 [hereinafter AFSPA].
81 SAHRDC AFSPA Report, supra note 80 (quoting AFSPA, supra note 80, § 4(a)).
82 id.
83 Id. Although AFSPA was defined to deal with armed insurgents, it is of interest in the
history of India's antiterrorist response as modem day national security legislation has come





employ the criminal justice system. 87 Article 22 of the Indian Constitution
states that
No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as
soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to
consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice.
Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the
nearest magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding the
time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the magistrate
and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the
authority of a magistrate.
8 8
Despite the twenty-four hour requirement, AFSPA has allowed security
personnel to detain suspects for days and months at a time without ever
bringing them in front of a magistrate. 89 Article 22 does provide for limits
on the twenty-four hour requirement if the arrested detainee was
apprehended under preventive detention legislation.90  While some
organizations have argued that AFSPA is not preventive detention
legislation and therefore the requirements under Articles 22(1) and 22(2)
must be respected,91 they have added that even if AFSPA is found to be
preventive detention legislation, it still contravenes the constitutional rules
governing such legislation.92 Preventive detention laws can allow the
detention of the arrested person for up to three months.93 Under Article
22(4) an Advisory Board must review any detention longer than three
months and under Article 22(5) the person must be told the grounds of their
arrest. 94 Section 4(c) of AFSPA allows a person to be arrested without a
warrant on the suspicion that they are going to commit an offense. 95 The
arresting forces are not required to communicate the grounds of the arrest,
and no advisory board is empowered to review the arrests under AFSPA. 96
The justification for these constitutionally questionable provisions has been
that under Article 355 of the Indian Constitution, the Central Government
has a duty to protect states from internal disturbances, and as such, AFSPA
87 id.
88 INDIA CONST. art. 22.




93 INDIA CONST. art. 22(4)-(5).
94 id.
95 AFSPA, supra note 80, § 4(c).
96 SAHRDC AFSPA Report, supra note 80.
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was born out of that duty.97 While a number of cases questioning the
constitutionality of AFSPA have been filed with the Supreme Court of
India, the Court has yet to hand down a final judgment on its provisions,
and the controversial legislation remains in effect today.9 8
AFSPA was the precursor to the more recent antiterrorist legislation
that applies throughout all of India, the Terrorist And Disruptive Activities
(Prevention) Act (TADA) and most recently POTA. AFSPA, like its
antiterrorist offspring, endowed law enforcement powers beyond the scope
of normal criminal procedure and justified the suspension of normal rights
due to the threat the insurgents posed to national security. 99 TADA and its
latest incarnation POTA will be discussed in the following sections.
B. TERRORIST AND DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) ACT, 1987
While AFSPA dealt with a targeted, troubled region within India,
TADA was antiterrorist legislation that was meant to apply throughout all
of India. i00 Originally adopted in May 1985 and expected to expire within
two years, the central government renewed TADA in 1987 for another six
years. 10' The government stated that the "continuing menace" of terrorism
made it "necessary to [not just] continue the said law, but also strengthen it
further."' 02 Under Section 3(1) of TADA, a terrorist was broadly defined
as:
Whoever with intent to overawe the Government as by law established or to strike
terror in the people or any section of the people or to alienate any section of the
people or to adversely affect the harmony amongst different sections of the people
does any act or thing by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances or
inflammable substances or fire-arms or other lethal weapons or poisons or noxious
gases or other chemicals or by any other substances (whether biological or otherwise)
of a hazardous nature in such a manner as to cause, or as is likely to cause, death of, or
injuries to, any person or persons or loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property
or disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community, or
detains any person and threatens to kill or injure such person in order to compel the
Government or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act, commits a
terrorist act.




100 C.I.S. Supp. Part 1, § 1(2) (1987), The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities





the death of another person was a minimum of five years, extending up to
life imprisonment. 10 3 In addition to the commission of a terrorist attack,
TADA criminalized the concealment or harboring of any terrorist' 04 -
whether known or unknown-and made punishable the abetting or
advisement of any terrorist act. 10 5 As the Act admittedly did not result in a
reduction of terrorist activity in the periods of 1985-1987, the government
amended TADA in 1987 to increase the powers given to law enforcement
in the hopes of deterring future terrorist attacks. 1
06
One of the amended changes allowed for the admission of confessions
of detainees in the legal proceedings against them. 10 7  Due to the long
history of police brutality during interrogations and the forcible eliciting of
confessions under British Rule, the Indian Criminal Procedure Code had
barred confessions made to police officers, making them inadmissible in a
court of law.10 8  In 1987, TADA reduced the standards required for a
positive eyewitness identification to be admissible in court. 10 9 While the
Code of Criminal Procedure required identification be made at a test
identification parade, TADA allowed identification based on a witness
having picked out the detainee's photograph." 0
In addition, TADA was also amended to change the burden of proof
against suspected terrorists. In contrast to the traditional criminal procedure
which presumed the innocence of a detainee prior to their being found
guilty by a court of law, TADA presumed a suspect guilty if they were
found to be in possession of arms, weapons, or explosives specified by prior
legislation,' 1 or if the fingerprints of the accused were found at the scene of
the terrorist act. 12 The presumption of guilt also applies to cases where the
detainee has been accused of involvement in the act by the confession of a
103 Id. Part 1, § 3(2).
'04 Id. Part 2, § 3(4).
105 Id. Part 2, § 3(3).
106 Id. pmbl.
107 Id. Part 3, § 15(1).
108 "Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 explicitly prohibit the
admissibility of confessions made to police officers as evidence. These provisions were
introduced and remain in Indian law because of the acknowledgement that 'confessions' are
regularly extracted by police through torture or duress in India." AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
INDIA: AN APPEAL AGAINST DEATH SENTENCES (1999), at http://web.amnesty.org/
library/Index/ENGASA200311999?open&of=ENG-1ND.
109 TADA, Part 4, § 22.
'10 Id. Part 4, § 22.
"' Id. Part 4, § 3(1)(a) (specifically, the weapons or explosives listed in "the Arms Act,
1959 (34 of 1959), the Explosives Act, 1884 (4 of 1884), the Explosive Substances Act,
1908 (6 of 1908), or the Inflammable Substances Act, 1952 (20 of 1952)").
112 Id. Part 4, § 21(1)(b).
[Vol. 95
2004] HISTORY OF ANTITERRORIST LEGISLATION IN INDIA 331
co-accused party,1 13 or if the accused has made a confession to anyone other
than a police officer.
1 14
One of the most controversial aspects of TADA related to the broad
definition that applied to the crime of "abetting a terrorist or terrorist act."
' ' 15
Under Section 2(1)(a) of TADA, any person who is found to have assisted
terrorists or disruptionists in any manner may be subject to a minimum
penalty of five years imprisonment.' 1 6 Abetment is defined as the passing
on of "any information likely to assist... terrorists. After
implementation and widespread use of this section by law enforcement
officials, the Supreme Court eventually struck down this broad definition as
it criminalized association with terrorists and did not require any criminal
intent. 118
While the increased powers under the amended version of TADA
purported to give law enforcement more tools to better deal with increased
terrorist activity, the actual result of the new law was widespread abuse as
its broad definition of terrorism was used to crack down on political
dissidents, regardless of whether the dissent was violent, and was used in
some regions exclusively against religious and ethnic minorities. 1 9 For
example, in the state of Rajasthan as of September 1, 1994, 409 of 432
people detained were minorities. 120 Other published statistics of detentions
under TADA paint a similarly grim picture showing selective enforcement
and widespread abuse. The largest number of arrests made under TADA
were not, as one would expect, in the highly volatile regions of Punjab or
Assam, but rather in Gujarat, a state not threatened by any secessionist or
terrorist movements. 12 1 In Gujarat, the government used TADA to crush
political activity by students and labor unions. 122 Of the 52,998 people
detained under TADA at the end of 1992, a mere 434, or 0.81%, had been
convicted. 1
23
113 Id. Part 4, § 21(1)(c).
114 Id. Part 4, § 21(1)(d).
115 Id. Part 1, § 2(1)(a)(i-iii); id. Part 2, § 3(3).
116 Id. Part 2, § (3)(3).
117 Id. Part 1, § 2(1)(a)(ii).
118 SOUTH ASIA HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CENTRE, HUMAN RIGHTS
DOCUMENTATION CENTER, PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ORDINANCE 2001: GOVERNMENT
DECIDES To PLAY JUDGE AND JURY 24, (2001) [hereinafter SAHRDC POTA Report]
(referencing Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 S.C.C. 569 (India)).
119 Chakma, supra note 12, at 27.
120 Id.




Despite these statistics and widespread criticism by human rights
groups, TADA was further extended an additional two years in 1993.124
The extension was passed despite anecdotes telling of widespread torture
and abuse under TADA. 125 Amnesty International documented the story of
one young man who was detained under TADA and during interrogation
was "hung upside down, given electric shocks in his genitals, fingers,
tongue and nose, and forced to eat human feces.' 26  Amnesty also
documented the case of Harjit Singh, an individual detained under TADA
whose friends and family were not told of the detention until it was revealed
that he had been killed in police custody eight years prior. 27 While the
specific cases of torture and extrajudicial executions may not be the direct
result of TADA, the increased police power and subsequent decreased
rights of detainees under the legislation created situations which allowed
these events to go unnoticed.
In 1995, under the weight of tremendous public outcry, the Indian
government finally allowed TADA to expire. 128  The National Human
Rights Commission of India (NHRC) applauded the decision and noted that
TADA was "incompatible with [India's] cultural traditions, legal history
and treaty obligations.', 129  However, just five years after TADA's
expiration, the government attempted to revive TADA and, in keeping with
the pattern of past legislation, increase the power of law enforcement
officials attempting to battle terrorism. 130 The newly proposed legislation
drafted by the Law Commission of India was known as the Prevention of
Terrorism Bill, 2000.131 With the abuses of TADA still fresh in their mind,
political parties, human rights organizations, and the NHRC vocally
opposed the new bill so strongly that it was never formally introduced in
parliament. 32 However, one year later, after the September 11 th attacks in
the United States and the December 13th attacks in New Delhi, the Bill,
124 id.
125 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INDIA: PROPOSED ANTITERRORIST LEGISLATION RISKS




128 SAHRDC POTA Report, supra note 118, at 31.
129 Id. at 14 (citing NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS,
PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ORDINANCE, 2001 (2001), at http://www.mha.nic.in/
prl0200l.htm#2510 (hereinafter MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS]).
130 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, BRIEFING ON THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ORDINANCE
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now known as the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), was passed with
virtually no changes in content from its initial structure.
133
C. PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT, 2001
Despite the well-documented rampant abuses under TADA, a mere
seven years after its expiration, the Indian government enacted the more
stringent POTA in March 2002.134 The dramatics of the December 13th
attacks on the Parliament building, combined with the September 11 th
atrocities in the United States gave the supporters of POTA ammunition
against detractors of the bill who were wary of increasing police power
given the long history of past abuses.' 35  The Indian Ministry of Home
Affairs (MHA) justified the Ordinance by claiming "an upsurge of terrorist
activities, intensification of cross border terrorism, and insurgent groups in
different parts of the country." 136 The Indian government also justified
POTA by pointing to the United Kingdom's adoption of the Prevention of
Terrorism Act (PTA) and the United States' PATRIOT Act as evidence that
other countries had acknowledged the need to move beyond traditional
domestic criminal procedure in order to properly battle terrorism. 137 The
dominant theme running through the government position in this debate
was that the current laws left law enforcement ill-equipped to handle the
new threats brought on by terrorism and, as such, new legislation was
necessary. 1
38
POTA retained a number of TADA's most controversial provisions
and further added powers not present in the old legislation. 139 POTA kept
the broad definition of "terrorist act" from TADA, which had been
repeatedly used under the prior legislation to take crimes such as murder
and robbery, normally handled by the Indian Penal Code, and placed them
133 SAHDRC POTA Report, supra note 118, at 39; see also POTA, supra note 12.
134 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE NAME OF COUNTER-TERRORISM: HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES WOLDWIDE (2003), at 15, available at http://www.hrw.org/un/chr59/counter-
terrorism-bck4.htm#P252_51825 [hereinafter HRW India Report].
135 SAHRDC POTA Report, supra note 118, at 13.
36 Id. (quoting MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, supra note 129). However, at the time of
the introduction of the draft version of the Bill in 2000, the MHA's own assessments
contradict this justification-its Annual Report for the year 2000 reported a decrease in
terrorist incidents in Jammu and Kashmir, a state which remains the main focus of the Indian
Government's counter-terrorism measures. MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT
ch. 4, § 4.8 (2000).
1 SAHRDC POTA Report, supra note 118, at 35.
138 Id. at 17-19. The government in virtually all debates about National Security
Legislation has used this justification.
"' Id. at 39.
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under the purview of the special procedures established by the antiterrorist
legislation.140 The criminalization of "abetting" a terrorist, which had been
struck down in TADA by the Indian Supreme Court, is revived under
POTA. 14 1  It criminalizes the membership of an organization labeled
"terrorist" by the Central Government, regardless of criminal intent or
activity.142 POTA also retained the admissibility of confessions, a provision
that many had pointed to as one of the sources of the high incidences of
torture and brutality during TADA interrogations.' 
43
POTA goes beyond TADA in numerous ways. While TADA was
reviewed every two years, POTA will first be subject to legislative scrutiny
in 2007, five years after its enactment. 144 Mandatory minimum sentences
were retained for crimes handled under POTA, reducing judicial freedom to
judge cases on their individual merits. 145
In keeping with the pattern of past antiterrorist legislation, POTA
treats terrorist acts as outside the normal criminal procedure which has been
established to balance the rights of criminal defendants with the interests of
the State. POTA establishes special courts to handle cases of terrorism.
146
These special courts have the discretion to hold trials in non-public places
such as prisons and have the power to withhold trial records from the
public.147 These courts may also keep the identity of witnesses used against
defendants secret, 48 and have the discretion of beginning proceedings
against a defendant even if they or their legal representation are absent.
49
POTA also significantly departs from traditional Indian Criminal
Procedure by allowing the pretrial detention of a suspected terrorist for up
to 180 days. 150 This prolonged detention before being brought in front of a
court leaves the door open for police brutality and arbitrary detention of
political opponents.'5l
Since its enactment over one year ago, POTA has provided ample
140 Id. at 40.
141 Id. Part 2, § 3(3).
142 Id. Part 2, § 3(5).
141 Id. Part 4, § 32; SAHRDC POTA Report, supra note 118, at 80.
144 SAHRDC POTA Report, supra note 118, at 39.
145 POTA Part 2, § 5.
146 Id. Part 4, § 23.
141 Id. Part 4, § 24.
148 Id. Part 4, §§ 30(2)(b)-(c).
149 Id. Part 4, § 29(5).
50 Id. Part 6, § 49(2)(b) (contrast with INDIA CODE CRIM. PROC. §§151(2), 167(2) which
mandate that defendants be brought in front of a magistrate within twenty-four hours of
apprehension).
' SAHRDC POTA Report, supra note 118, at 87-88.
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evidence that its opponents' worries about abuse were well founded.,52 In
the year since POTA has been in force, Human Rights Watch has
documented the Act's use against political opponents, religious minorities,
Dalits (untouchables), tribals, and children. 53 On July 11, 2002, in the state
of Tamil Nadu, Vaiko, a leader of the opposition political party, was
arrested and charged under POTA for making remarks in support of the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, an organization deemed terrorist by the
central government. 154 Two weeks later, P. Nedumaran, another opposition
leader in Tamil Nadu, was arrested under POTA for similar charges.
55
In Uttar Pradesh, twenty-five Dalits were arrested under POTA
between April and July 2002.56 Tribals in the area claim that POTA has
been used to characterize their struggle for worker's rights as membership
in the banned, extreme leftist Maoist-Leninist groups known collectively as
Naxalites.157 In one district, "nine out of twelve people arrested were
bonded laborers who refused to return to work because of the physical
abuse of their employer."' 58 POTA has been used in a similar way in the
state of Jharkhand.' 59 On February 19, 2003, almost 200 people were
arrested under POTA, including "a twelve-year-old boy and an eighty-one-
year-old man."'160 The arrests were criticized widely, leading the Deputy
Prime Minister Advani to direct the state to review the cases.' 61 The
resulting investigation concluded with charges against eighty-three of the
detainees being dropped. 1
62
In response to these abuses, a newly elected Cabinet repealed POTA in
September 2004.163 Discussions are underway regarding new antiterrorist
legislation that will "definitely be milder than the old law," and tries to
ensure that "innocents don't suffer."' 164 While it would be a leap to say that
POTA is the sole cause of the rampant abuse of power by police officers, it
seems clear that the reduction of defendant's rights under the legislation had











163 POTA To Go, Centre to Beef up on Another Law, THE INDIAN ExPREss, Sept. 18,
2004, available at http://www.indianexpress.com/fullstory.php.?content-id=55357.
164 Id. (quoting Indian Home Minister Shivraj Patil).
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made such abuses easier to conceal and harder to report. For each reported
case of abuse, countless unknown ones remain undocumented due to the
defendant's lack of social network, the prolonged period of pretrial
detention, and the secrecy of the courts when the cases do get to trial.
The next section will conclude with an analysis on India's antiterrorist
legislation and will highlight some lessons the United States may wish to
keep in mind as it moves further into the complicated world of
counterterrorism legislation.
V. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE, POST 9/11
There may be a temptation to dismiss the history of India's abuse of
antiterrorist legislation as a unique problem suffered by a developing
country struggling with a distinctive social and political context that does
not apply to the United States. There may be some merit in setting aside
tales of particularly egregious torture and abuse in India as the illegal
activities of individuals going beyond their official duties sanctioned by the
state.165  However, the India experience is not meant to serve as a
cautionary tale about specific acts of abuse but rather as an example of
recurrent patterns of abuse encountered when attempting to combat
terrorism. As will be discussed below, the pattern seen in India of greater
state secrecy coupled with increased law enforcement power, the overbroad
definitions of terrorism used to expand the subject matter antiterrorist
legislation applies to, and the almost-exclusive targeting of religious and
ethnic minorities, can also be seen emerging in the United States.
A. HISTORICAL ABUSES BY U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
Attorney General John Ashcroft has warned that "those who scare
peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty... give ammunition to
America's enemies, and pause to America's friends.' 66 Supporters of the
PATRIOT Act have echoed the Attorney General's sentiments regarding
the "phantoms of lost liberty" and stated that critics of antiterrorist
legislation are relying on hypothetical abuses that detractors think will be
165 SAHRDC POTA Report, supra note 118, at 87-88. While the torture discussed
previously in Section IV is not sanctioned by Indian counterterrorist legislation, critics have
argued that the decreased rights given to criminal defendants increase the chances that they
may be subjected to torture.
166 John W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting "Enduring Freedom" for
"Homeland Security": A Constitutional Analysis of the USA PATRIOTACT and the Justice
Department's Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REv. 1081, 1100 (2002) (quoting
Homeland Defense Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (Sept. 25,
2001) (written testimony of the Honorable John Ashcroft, Attorney General)).
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perpetrated by the American government on its citizens. 67 However, critics
have responded to such arguments by pointing out that documentation of
abuses committed under the PATRIOT Act is nearly impossible as the
Justice Department has repeatedly refused to divulge information on
individuals detained or warrants secured under the PATRIOT Act.' 
68
Critics of the PATRIOT Act also scoff at their being characterized as
anti-government conspiracy theorists and point to the history of abuses
committed by domestic intelligence agencies during the Cold War as basis
for their fears that antiterrorist legislation will be used improperly. 69 In the
mid 1970's, following revelations about intelligence agency misconduct
during the Watergate and Nixon impeachment hearings, the secret world of
U.S. intelligence agency activity was briefly put in the national spotlight.1
7 0
House and Senate investigation committees coupled with independent
investigative reports revealed the staggering scope of intelligence agency
surveillance of U.S. citizens during the 1960's.17 1 It was found that FBI
headquarters had over 500,000 files on groups or individuals inside the
United States. 172 Between 1953 and 1973, over 250,000 letters inside the
United States were opened and photographed by CIA. 173 Over 100,000
Americans were profiled in Army intelligence dossiers.
174
Intelligence agencies went beyond mere collection of information by
developing programs to "disrupt, neutralize, and destroy those perceived as
enemies.', 175 These activities were consistent with the mandate of a 1954
Hoover Commission on Government Organization classified report that
stated, "we must learn to subvert, sabotage, and destroy our enemies by
more clever, more sophisticated and more effective methods than those
used against US.' 176 While these abuses occurred under the anti-Communist
consensus of the 1950's,177 opponents of the PATRIOT Act worry that they
may be repeated under the new anti-terrorist consensus that has taken hold
167 R. Robin McDonald, PATRIOT Act: Are Abuses Real?, 11 FULTON COUNTY DAILY




170 MORTON HALPERIN, ET AL., THE LAWLESS STATE: THE CRIMES OF THE U.S.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 1 (1976).
171 Id. at 2 (The final Congressional report was suppressed by Congress itself.).




176 Id. at 4.
177 Id. at 6.
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since September 11 th.
Similar to India's short-term memory regarding the abuses that took
place under TADA, the lessons learned from Cold War intelligence agency
abuses seem to have faded. Much of the blame for the intelligence failure
that allowed the September 1 1th attacks to occur has been placed on
limitations on the intelligence agencies that were enacted because of the
investigations of the 1970s. 178 As a result, the PATRIOT Act has greatly
expanded the powers given to law enforcement if the investigations are
related to terrorism.
For example, Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act allows seizures of
records and "other tangible items including computer systems" from
businesses including libraries and prohibits people from disclosing
knowledge of these seizures.179 In a one-year period immediately after the
September 11 th attacks, federal and local law enforcement officers had
visited nearly eleven percent of all public libraries requesting library
records.180  Seizures of records are authorized if the Attorney General
certifies that they are "in furtherance of 'an investigation to protect against
international terrorism ... ,,,181 Prior to the enactment of the PATRIOT
Act, a warrant and probable cause that a crime had been committed was
required to access private records. 1
82
B. OVERBROAD DEFINITION OF "TERRORISM"
What is particularly worrisome about the reduced standards required to
investigate and seize private records is that the definition of terrorism has
been broadened considerably since September 1 th. 83 Section 802 of the
PATRIOT Act defines "domestic terrorism" as acts that:
178 See generally THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED
STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT (2004), available at http://www.9-
I1 commission.gov/report/91 lReport.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2004); 9/11 Commission
Faults U.S. Intelligence, CNN, May 19, 2004, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2O04/ALLPOLITICS/04/14/911.commission/.
179 Whitehead & Aden, supra note 166, at 1099.
IS0 Norman Oder, Survey: Librarians Divided Over Post-9/11 Privacy Issues, LIBRARY
JOURNAL, Feb. 15, 2003, available at http://www.libraryjournal.com/article/CA273945.
181 Whitehead & Aden, supra note 166, at 1100 (quoting USA PATRIOT Act § 215,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 287 (2001)).
182 Dahlia Lithwick & Julia Turner, A Guide to the PATRIOTAct, Part 1, SLATE, Sept. 8,
2003, at http://slate.msn.com/id/2087984/.
183 Whitehead & Aden, supra note 166, at 1092 (citing USA PATRIOT Act, 115 Stat. at
376 ("providing... that violation of certain domestic criminal laws constitutes domestic
terrorism")).
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(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of
the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended -
i. to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
ii. to influence the policy of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or
kidnapping; or
iii. to effect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or
kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.184
Critics have expressed discomfort with this overly broad definition that
may potentially be used against domestic political groups such as "Act Up,
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Operation Rescue and the
,,185Vieques demonstrators. Attorney General Ashcroft has attempted to
allay these fears by stating that since 1983, the U.S. government has defined
terrorists as only "those who perpetrate premeditated, politically motivated
violence against noncombatant targets.' 86  However, if this is the case,
commentators have wondered why the Bush Administration felt the need to
expand the definition to include a "wide variety of domestic criminal
acts."'187 As the Indian experience has shown, there is a propensity for
government to take advantage of the generalized definition of terrorism to
neutralize political opponents and minority groups.
88
C. TARGETING OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC MINORITIES IN THE UNITED
STATES
Immediately after September 11 th, Arabs and Muslims in the United
States were subject to racial profiling. 89 Airlines removed passengers that
were, or appeared to be, Muslim or Arab.' 90 This ad hoc system of racial
184 Id. at 1092-93 (quoting USA PATRIOT Act § 802, 115 Stat. at 376).
185 Id.
186 Id. at 1093-94 (quoting DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending
Against Terrorism Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (Dec. 6,
2001) (written statement of the Honorable John Ashcroft, Attorney General)).
187 Id. at 1094.
188 See supra Section IV.
189 Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After
September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
295 (2001-2003).
190 Id. at 295-96 (One of the passengers removed was a Secret Service agent protecting
President Bush.); Ken Ellingwood & Nicholas Riccardi, Arab Americans Enduring Hard
Stares of Other Fliers, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2001, at Al; Guard for Bush Isn't Allowed
Aboard Flight, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2001, at B5.
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profiling was roundly criticized, but in its place, a formalized, government
sanctioned system that rates each passenger's security threat level and
assigns it a color-code is proposed to be adopted by 2004.191 Passenger
information will be compared "against criminal records and intelligence
information" to determine the exact level of threat the passenger poses. 
192
While on its face the proposed changes may seem innocuous, there is a
fear that the assessment of security risk will unduly burden those with
Muslim or Arab backgrounds. 193  In September of 2002, immigration
authorities at Kennedy Airport apprehended Maher Arar, a Syrian-born
Canadian Citizen because his name had appeared on a watch list of possible
international terrorists. 194 Upon seizure, Arar was denied the right to speak
with a lawyer and was flown to Washington D.C. to meet with what were
presumably CIA agents. 195 From there, Arar was flown to Syria, which
while being the place of his birth was a country Arar had not lived in for
sixteen years. 196 In Syria, Arar was placed in an underground cell "3 feet
wide, 6 feet long, 7 feet high.' 197 For ten months Syrian authorities tortured
and interrogated Arar. 198 When finally convinced that he had no ties to
terrorism, he was let go-some forty pounds lighter than when he had first
arrived at Kennedy Airport. 199
Arar had been placed on the terrorist watch list because intelligence
agencies suspected that he might be a member of the group The Muslim
Brotherhood.200 The tenuous link tying Arar to the organization was that
nine years prior, well after he had moved to Canada with his family, Arar's
mother's cousin had been a member of the group.20 1 Additionally, the
United States had learned from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police that
"the lease on Arar's apartment had been witnessed by a Syrian-born
Canadian who was believed to know an Egyptian-Canadian whose brother




193 See Graham Fraser & Susan Delacourt, Ottawa Calls Inquiry Into Maher Arar Case,
TORONTO STAR, Jan. 29, 2004, at A01; Christopher H. Pyle, Torture By Proxy: How
Immigration Threw a Traveler to the Wolves, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 4, 2004, at D1.
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was allegedly mentioned in an al-Qaeda document. 2 °2
Given the flimsiness of the evidence that allowed Maher Arar to be
tortured for ten months, it seems understandable to be wary of the proposed
color-coded security risk screening system proposed by the Transportation
Security Administration. All passengers that are screened "red," estimated
to be one to two percent of all airline passengers, will be prohibited from
boarding the airplane, subjected to police questioning, and possibly
arrested.20 3  Since September I Ith, many of those detained as suspected
terrorists "have been discouraged from obtaining legal counsel or have had
access to counsel blocked outright."204Once detained, Muslims also have
legitimate reason to fear their treatment in the prison system. A Justice
Department report has asserted that the majority of current reported
violations against Muslims have involved mistreatment at Bureau of Prisons
facilities.0 5 Incidents have included a prison guard verbally abusing a
Muslim man and throwing his Quran into a garbage can and the claims that
"a prison warden and some guards threatened to gas certain inmates after"
the September 1 th attacks.20 6
The combination of security policies weighted towards detaining those
of Muslim or Arab descent, coupled with the reduction of rights granted to
detainees, expands the opportunity for abuse.20 7 Much in the same way that
the Indian government had demonized and targeted the Muslim population
after high profile terrorist attacks, U.S. policies also seem to unfairly target
the Arab and Muslim populations. Even prior to September 1 th, Muslims
had disproportionately borne the weight of heightened suspicion of being
involved in terrorist activities. 208 In 1998, of the eighty-seven terrorist
attacks in the United States since 1984, eighty-five were tied to non-Arab,
non-Muslim groups.20 9 Despite this, of the twenty-eight groups designated
as terrorist organizations by the Secretary of State in 1999, over half were
202 Id.
203 Goo, supra note 191.
204 Whitehead & Aden, supra note 166, at 1117.
205 Curt Anderson, Justice Investigators Find No Abuses of Anti-Terrorism PATRIOT
Act, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 27, 2004.
206 Id.
207 See generally Michael J. Whidden, Note, Unequal Justice: Arabs and United States
Antiterrorism Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 2825 (2001) (arguing that the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act "has been disproportionately felt by Arabs in its
designation the application of the fundraising prohibition, and the authorization of secret
evidence").
208 See id.
209 Id. at 2829. One of these terrorist attacks was the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.
However, the Oklahoma City bombing far exceeded the 1993 attack in terms of total number
of casualties and the cost of property damage. Id.
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"either Muslim or Arab. 21°
VI. CONCLUSION: LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM INDIA'S EXPERIENCE
The history of antiterrorist legislation in India supports the old
assertion that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.2 '
Since before Independence, the rulers of the Indian subcontinent have
struggled with how best to tackle asymmetrical warfare. While the number
of terrorist attacks have waxed and waned over time, individual acts of
violence against the State have never been completely eradicated. While
the Indian government has endowed its law enforcement and military with
more and more power to extinguish the threat of terrorism, there is scant
evidence that this increase in privileges has had its desired effect. What has
been well documented is that with each piece of additional legislation and
slight diminishment of criminal defendant rights comes increased abuse.
It would be unfair to conclude that the Indian experience will be
mirrored in the United States. The history of corruption in India that began
with the British colonization has continued virtually unabated in to India's
current democratic incarnation. 212 The relative youth of the Indian nation
and its comparative economic disadvantages may perhaps be significant
differences with the United States that will result in a divergent trajectory
for antiterrorist legislation in the United States. However, despite these
differences, the patterns of overreach and abuse that exist in India can
already be seen emerging in the United States.
One consistent theme that has run through the Indian experience is the
reach of antiterrorist legislation into areas that many argue are properly
handled under the traditional criminal procedure. One of the culprits of this
abuse has been an overly broad definition of what constitutes a "terrorist"
act. As antiterrorist legislation often endows law enforcement with greater
freedoms and less procedural hurdles to clear when conducting an
investigation, there has been a historical trend to use this increased power in
cases that may not have originally been in reach of the legislation. This has
been shown time and time again in India and isolated incidents in the
United States begin to show a pattern following this same trend.
210 Id. at 2828.
211 Letter from Lord Acton, to Bishop Mandell Creighton (1887). "Power tends to
corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." Id.
212 In the 2003 Transparency International rankings of corruption levels across the world,
India ranked the 83rd least corrupt country while the United States ranked 18th.
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEx 2003, available at
http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases archive/2003/dnld/cpi2003.pressrelease.en.pdf
(last visited Oct. 28, 2004).
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Another lesson to be learned from India is the need to temper
legislative response to a particular terrorist attack. As was shown by the
passage of the PATRIOT Act, a dramatic attack may leave the populace
feeling vulnerable and desiring signs that their government is taking
adequate measures to prevent such incidents from occurring again.
However, it should be remembered that the legislation passed in these
highly emotional times often are ancestors of failed past attempts to
augment police powers. As the Indian government passed the controversial
POTA in wake of the December 13th attacks, despite the long history of
abuse that existed under TADA, the American populace should be wary of
any attempts to hastily pass the equally controversial PATRIOT Act II,
particularly if another attack is takes place on U.S. soil.
Terrorism is a real, devastating problem. The proper response by legal
systems to this problem remains elusive. As countries such as the United
States endeavor to find the proper reaction, they should look to the histories
of other countries such as India in an effort to not repeat mistakes and
abuses made in the past. India's experience is an example of the danger of
overreaching, overly broad legislation that is ripe for abuse against the most
vulnerable sectors of a society. The United States should keep this in mind
when examining whether to renew the PATRIOT Act in 2005 and when
new legislation, such as the PATRIOT Act II, is under consideration.
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